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Abstract.  Naturalist  theories of representation have been attacked on the grounds of being too
liberal  on  the  minimal  conditions  for  intentionality:  they  treat  several  states  that  are  not
representational as genuine representations.  Behind this  attack lies the problem of demarcation:
what  are  the  minimal  conditions  for  intentionality  that  a  state  should  satisfy  to  be  genuinely
representational? What are the limits of intentionality? This paper develops a dual proposal to solve
this problem. First, I defend the explanatory role criterion in order to assess proposals of minimal
conditions for intentionality. I start by proposing the success pattern condition: a state represents a
given external feature provided that there is a success pattern present in the behavioural output, and
the  system uses  this  state  as  a  proxy  for  the  presence  of  this  external  feature.  However,  this
condition is not sufficient for minimal intentionality – there are both intentional and non-intentional
success patterns. Another minimal condition is, hence, required to draw this distinction. I propose
the constancy mechanism condition: a state is representational provided that the system employs a
constancy mechanism in its production. The success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions
jointly  constitute  the  dual  proposal  for  minimal  intentionality.  I  argue  that  this  proposal  is
explanatorily justified and, so, properly demarcates the limits of intentionality.  
Keywords: minimal intentionality; problem of demarcation; naturalist theories of representation;
constancy mechanism; success pattern. 
This paper addresses a specific question. What are the minimal conditions for intentionality
that  a  given  state  should  satisfy  to  constitute  a  representational  state?  This  is  the problem  of
demarcation. Its solution requires a principled demarcation of the limits of intentionality. The goal
of this paper is to develop a dual proposal of minimal conditions for intentionality. First of all, I
introduce the problem of demarcation and show its relevance for the debate on the viability of
naturalist theories of representation. I start by proposing the success pattern condition. Its starting
point  is  that  intentional  explanations  of  behaviour  have  the  distinctive  explanatory  power  of
explaining  successful behaviour.  This gives rise to the success pattern condition:  a given state is
representational provided that there is a success pattern present in the behavioural output, and the
system uses this state as a proxy for the presence of the relevant external condition. However, this
minimal condition alone draws the lower border of intentionality too low. The objection of liberality
is  that  the  delivered  demarcation  is  too  liberal  because  it  treats  systems  that  are  clearly  not
representational  as  representational.  The  establishment  of  another  minimal  condition  is,  hence,
required.  I propose  the constancy mechanism condition: a given state is representational provided
that the sensory system employs a constancy mechanism in its production, such that the production
of the state remains constant when the external feature obtains,  despite the variety of proximal
stimuli  reaching  the  system’s  sensory  apparatus.  Together,  the  success  pattern  and  constancy
mechanism conditions give rise to the dual proposal for minimal intentionality.  I argue that  this
proposal draws the genuine limits of intentionality.
1. Minimal Intentionality and the Problem of Demarcation
 Some  states  represent  the  world.  Beliefs,  desires  and  other  mental  states  are  typical
representational states. For instance, my belief that London is an English city is a mental state that
represents London as an English city. But how is it possible for a state to represent anything in the
first place? Naturalist theories of representation try to give an account of representational states by
taking as a starting point the assumption that representational states are natural states. Paradigmatic
examples are teleological (Millikan, 1984, 2004; Papineau, 1993, 2017) and causal-informational
theories (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1987).  
 However, naturalist theories are often attacked on the grounds of being too  liberal  on the
minimal conditions that a state should satisfy to be representational (Sterelny, 1995; Burge, 2010;
Rescorla, 2013). That is, they consider certain states that are clearly not representational as genuine
representations. But how do we decide when a given theory of representation is too liberal? What is
at issue here is the extent of the ultimate limits of intentionality that distinguish borderline cases of
representational states from non-representational states. A theory is too liberal when it sets these
limits too low. This is the  problem of demarcation: what are the  minimal conditions  that a state
should satisfy to be genuinely representational? Which states have minimal intentionality?
Evidently,  some  representational  states  are  more  complex than  others,  i.e.,  there  is  a
hierarchy of representational states. Complex representations lie at the top of this hierarchy, while
primitive  representations  are  at  its  bottom.  Consider  higher-level  states  such  as  propositional
attitudes,  representations  of  molecules  or  republics,  etc.  Their  representational  status  is
uncontroversial – this is a starting point in the debate on minimal intentionality. What is at issue is
the representational status of lower-level states: which ones are genuinely representational? Here
there  are  several  candidates.  Are  tropistic  states  of  amoebas,  planaria  and  paramecia  genuine
representations of light? Are honeybees’ waggle dances representations of the direction of nectar?
Are frogs’ sensory states that trigger the catching behaviour real representations of flies? 
 Minimal  conditions  for  intentionality  are  those  satisfied  by  primitive  representations,  in
contrast with non-representational states. That is, a given candidate for primitive representation is
not  representational  if  it  fails  to  satisfy  them.  The  establishment  of  minimal  conditions  for
intentionality  is  required  to  draw the  limits  of  intentionality  and,  so,  to  solve  the  problem of
demarcation.  Only  then  will  there  be  a  principled  proposal  for  the  limits  of  intentionality,  in
opposition with a merely arbitrary one. 
 Consider a range of candidates for primitive representational states: some of  these lower-
level  states are  genuinely  representational,  while  others  are  not.  Now  suppose  that  there  is  a
demarcation line distinguishing representational from non-representational states. In particular, it
distinguishes  borderline  representational  states  from  borderline  non-representational  ones.  The
problem of demarcations consists in how to properly draw this line. The role of minimal conditions
for intentionality is precisely to distinguish, among borderline lower-level states, those with genuine
representational status from those that lack it.
 Here I  assume that primitive representations are  sensory states.1 The distinction between
representational  and  non-representational  lower-level  states  consists  in  a  distinction  between
representational and non-representational sensory states. For instance, tropism is the movement of
the  sensory  system  (or  parts  of  it)  in  a  given  direction,  in  response  to  an  external  stimulus.
Paramecia are unicellular tropistic organisms that move in the opposite direction of light. Do they
really represent the presence of light or just sensorily register it? Non-representational systems only
sensorily discriminate the relevant external stimuli, while representational ones represent them.
1 Naturalist philosophers often follow this assumption. See Millikan, 2004, p. 158; Burge, 2010, pp. 315-317; Schulte,
2015.
 In light of the problem of demarcation, consider naturalist theories of representation. It is not
possible to  assess each  one here,  so  let  us  focus  on arguably  the most  promising  one  –
teleosemantics. According to teleosemantics, representational states are reducible to natural states in
terms of the notion of  biological function. The relevant conception of biological function here is
aetiological: the function of a given biological trait is the effect for which it was selected. It is the
history  of  selection  of  traits  of  a  certain  kind  that  determines  their  biological  function.  The
paradigmatic selection process is natural selection: the selected effect is that one which increased
biological  fitness – success and reproduction of the biological trait.  Hence,  the function of the
pineal  gland  is  to  secret  melatonin  because  ancestral  pineal  glands  were  selected  for  that.
Teleosemantics establishes the following minimal condition for intentionality.
Teleosemantics : a sensory state is representational provided that (T1) the behaviour triggered
by  the tokening of this state  has a  biological function;  (T2) the  system which produces the
behaviour uses this state as a proxy for the presence of some external condition.2
(T1) requires that the system which produces the behavioural output was selected to produce
it as a response to the tokening of the sensory state in order to fulfil the selected effect. It follows
that the behaviour has a biological function. (T2) requires that this system should use the sensory
state as a guide or proxy for the relevant external condition. For instance, the system will produce
different  behavioural  outputs  accordingly  to  the  location  of  the  represented  external  condition.
Notice that the teleosemantic minimal condition implies that tropistic systems, frogs, honeybees,
anaerobic bacteria and other  primitive systems are genuinely representational.3 Let us illustrate  it
with the paramecium again. 
 On one hand, the avoidance behaviour of the paramecium has the function of avoiding light
because ancestral paramecia were naturally selected for that. Such avoidance was adaptative for the
paramecium throughout its evolutionary history. So, the paramecium’s tropistic state which triggers
this avoidance behaviour satisfies (T1). On the other hand, the paramecium uses the tropistic state
as a proxy or guide for the production of the avoidance behaviour: when light is located in L1, the
paramecium moves in the opposite direction from L1; when light is in L2, the paramecium moves
in  the  opposite  direction  from L2,  etc.  So,  this  tropistic  state  also  satisfies  (T2).  In  sum,  the
paramecium’s tropistic state is genuinely representational according to the teleosemantic minimal
2 This is a very simple characterization of the teleosemantic minimal condition for intentionality. For more developed
ones, see Millikan, 2004, Papineau, 2017.
3 Teleosemanticists themselves explicitly  assume this implication. For instance,  Millikan (2004, pp. 157-160) claims
that anaerobic bacteria and honeybees are genuine representational systems: “there is intentionality here in the sort of
way that zero is a number. These are the most humble sorts of limiting cases of intentionality” (2004, p. 158).
condition.
  This implication led several philosophers to object that the teleosemantic minimal condition
draws the lower border of  representation too low (Burge, 2010, pp. 303-304). According to the
objection of liberality, teleosemantics is too liberal since it treats as representations several  states
that clearly are not representational:  sensory discrimination of light in tropistic systems such as
paramecia  (Fodor,  1986,  p.  10),  planaria  and  amoebas  (Burge,  2010,  p.  303);  alignment  of
magnetosomes of anaerobic bacteria (Burge, 2010, p. 300; Rescorla, 2013, p. 94; Schulte, 2015, p.
122); saliva as representing the presence of food (Sterelny, 1995, p. 256); and so on. But how do we
settle the issue of whether these states are representations or not? Why do some take it to be so clear
that they are not genuinely representational? 
 Here  one  may  argue  that  these  sensory  states  are  not  representations  because  their
representational  status  is  highly  counter-intuitive.  However,  an  intuitive  criterion  for  minimal
intentionality is hard to establish: it not clear what the supposed intuitions behind it are. After all,
what some may find intuitive, others may find counterintuitive. Anyway, it is not my goal here to
assess this debate on the intuitive criterion; rather, I will propose another one – the explanatory role
criterion (Burge, 2010; Rescorla, 2013; Ramsey, 2007).4
 Representation plays a distinctive explanatory role in cognitive science and other sciences
of  mind. Successful  scientific  theories  posit  representational  states  to  explain  the  behaviour  of
several  organisms: rats  (O’Keefe & Nadel,  1978),  toads (Ewert,  1980),  honeybees (von Frisch,
1967), vervet monkeys (Seyfarth & Cheney & Marler, 1980), etc. However, with great power comes
great  responsibility:  the  positing  of  a  sensory  state  as  representational  should  make  some
explanatory difference, otherwise the state should not be qualified as a representation. That is, one is
justified to posit a given state as a representation, in order to explain the behaviour of an organism,
provided  that  it  has  an  explanatory  purchase.  There  should  be  something  that  the  intentional
explanation is capable of explaining which the non-intentional explanation cannot explain. Suppose
that a given cognitive theory posits that a sensory state is a representation: the organism behaves in
a given way because it  represents a certain external condition. According to the explanatory role
criterion, such a positing is justified only if this sensory state plays the distinctive explanatory role
of representational states.  
The debate on minimal intentionality is centred on the explanatory constraint for assessing
the  representational  statuses  of  primitive  sensory  states.  But  what  is,  after  all,  the  distinctive
explanatory role of representational states? This is the hard problem that will be pursued throughout
this paper. The specification of the explanatory power of representation goes hand in hand with the
4 I assess the intuitive criterion elsewhere, see Souza Filho, 2018, pp. 116-129. 
specification of the minimal conditions for intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
fully justified demarcation proposal in light of the explanatory role criterion. 
2. The Success Pattern Proposal
The success pattern proposal maintains that the positing of a representational state gives rise
to an intentional explanation with the distinctive explanatory power of explaining success (Ramsey,
1990; Whyte, 1990). That is, the intentional explanation specifies the external condition in which
the triggered behavioural output succeeds in achieving the organism’s pursued result. By contrast,
the non-intentional explanation does not appeal to any pursued result and, hence, cannot explain
success. According to the success pattern proposal, this is the fundamental explanatory distinction
between intentional and non-intentional explanations. But how does the fact that the representation
pursues a given result make any difference to the explanation of behaviour?
 Suppose that a given organism has a behaviour pattern  B in response to a certain internal
state S that is triggered by an external condition C. What is the explanation for such behaviour? The
non-intentional explanation consists in a specification of the causal chain of the tokening of C that
triggers  S which results in  B.  It is potentially capable of explaining every causal transaction that
occurs between the tokening of C and the production of B. A full causal explanation of behaviour is
possible by establishing a wiring diagram that shows how environmental inputs affect states of the
organism that, in conjunction with other states of the organism, originate the behavioural output. In
light of this, a serious problem arises for the justification of intentional explanations: given that the
non-intentional explanation has the power of providing a full causal explanation of behaviour, what
is left to be explained by the intentional explanation?
 The  starting  point  is  that  intentional  explanations  are  external  explanations,  while  non-
intentional explanations are internal ones. The non-intentional explanation of behaviour establishes
no relation or connection between the organism and the external environment;  it  is  true of the
organism  irrespective  of  its  external  environment.  If  everything  is  changed  in  the  external
environment with the exception of the proximal stimulus that triggered the causal chain that resulted
in the bodily movement, the causal explanation would still be true of the organism. By contrast, the
intentional explanation is an external explanation. It establishes a new set of relations between the
organism and the external environment where it  is  embedded by establishing relations between
representational  states  and  environmental  features  (Shea,  2013,  p.  498).  The  non-intentional
explanation only specifies the relation between the organism and a certain proximal feature of the
environment,  namely,  the  proximal  stimulus  that  triggers  the  relevant  causal  chain.  Once  this
stimulus  is  specified,  the  non-intentional  explanation  has  nothing  more  to  say  about  the
environment. Hence, the establishment of relations between the representation and environmental
features is distinctive of intentional explanations. They do it in two steps. 
 First, the intentional explanation specifies the result or end that the organism pursues with
the  tokening  of  the  representation  and  the  resulting  behaviour.  The  pursued  result  is  directed
towards  a  given  external  feature  –  e.g.,  eating  or  avoiding  something.  Second,  the  intentional
explanation  specifies  the  success  conditions  for  the behavioural  output  to  achieve  this  external
result. The establishment of the relation between the organism and the external feature comes in two
steps because the establishment of success conditions presupposes the specification of the pursued
result; otherwise, it would not be possible to establish whether the behaviour succeeds in achieving
it or not. 
 The distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations consists in the explanation of
successful behaviour, i.e., the establishment of the success or failure of the behavioural output in
achieving  the  organism’s  pursued  result.  Intentional  and  non-intentional  explanations  establish
different descriptions of behaviour at different levels, namely, the success pattern description and
the non-intentional description. No matter how complete the non-intentional specification is of the
causal chain that leads from proximal stimulus to behavioural output, it is not capable of explaining
the success of the organism in achieving the pursued result. That is, the non-intentional explanation
is not capable of explaining successful behaviour. 
 Consider an organism which pursues the avoidance of predators. Now suppose that in a
given situation the tokening of a sensory state is what triggers  the avoidance behaviour towards
some predator. The non-intentional explanation of this behaviour consists in the specification of the
causal chain that starts with the stimulus input, leads to the token of the sensory state, and ends with
the  behavioural  output.  The  intentional  explanation  is  that  the  organism  escapes  because  it
represents the presence of the predator. The point of positing the sensory state as a representation is
that it gives rise to an explanation of the success or not of the organism in achieving the relevant
result – escaping from the predator. The true representation of the predator leads to the avoidance
behaviour which leads to the success of escaping from the predator; the false representation leads to
the failure of such avoidance because there is no predator around. The intentional explanation is
required here precisely for the explanation of the success or not of escaping from the predator. Two
factors guarantee success: first, that the sensory state truly represents the presence of the predator –
the external condition of the presence of the predator obtains; second, that the behavioural output is
the proper avoidance behaviour. The truth of the representation guarantees success provided that the
behaviour is appropriate.
 The explanatory power of intentional explanations lies in the capacity to explain success,
i.e., the achievement of the organism’s pursued result. There is a characteristic pattern assumed by
intentional explanations, the success pattern: a certain appropriate behaviour B in pursuing result R
is prompted by representational state S  that represents external condition  C; when  S is true (i.e.,
when  C obtains),  the  performance  of  B leads  to  the  achievement  of  R.  The  truth  of  the
representation explains the success of the appropriate behaviour in achieving the pursued result and
the falsehood explains the failure to achieve this result. The positing of the representational state by
the intentional explanation provides it with the  success explanatory power that is absent in non-
intentional explanations. This is what justifies the positing of the representational state.
  The success pattern proposal for the limits  of intentionality was originally proposed by
success  semanticists  (Ramsey,  1990;  Whyte,  1990)  and  is  also  assumed  by  teleosemanticists
(Millikan, 2004; Papineau, 1993, 2017). However, the success pattern proposal was not originally
formulated as a solution for the problem of demarcation. My job here is to adapt it as a proposal for
the minimal conditions for intentionality.
Furthermore, I take success patterns to be real in the sense of real patterns as introduced by
Daniel Dennett (1991).  Success patterns are  patterns of interaction between the behaviour of the
organism and the input stimuli from the environment. To say that a given success pattern exists in
an organism is to say that the behavioural output of the organism exhibits such a success pattern. A
success pattern is real because the behavioural output has this pattern irrespective of whether there
is anyone who recognises that it is there. Consider the catching behaviour of an organism towards
food in different  situations.  The intentional  explanation for  this  behaviour  is  that  the organism
represented the presence of food and, so, catches it. The success pattern is present in this behaviour
throughout these situations and it would be there even if an observer had never existed to verify its
presence. That is, there is a fact of the matter as to whether the behaviour has a success pattern. In
sum, intentional explanations pick up real success patterns of the way the organism interacts with
the surrounding environment.  
But how do intentional explanations determine the external result that the organism pursues?
For instance, what is the criterion for the specification that the organism’s pursued result is the
avoidance of a predator but not a different result? It is here that teleosemantics comes into play
(Papineau,  2017).  Teleosemanticists  claim that  the  pursued  result  of  a  representational  state  is
constituted by its  biological function. The organism tries to fulfil a certain biological function via
the tokening of the representation and the triggered behaviour.  It  is the biological function that
determines the organism’s pursued result, i.e., what it was  selected for. Hence, a representational
state has a function that determines its pursued result and, so, determines the success conditions for
the resulting behavioural output. In the predator example, the goal of the representational state is to
avoid predators because this is its biological function. In short,  success conditions are  biological
success conditions. However, the success pattern proposal is independent of any specification of the
pursued  result,  teleosemantic  or  not.  Note  that  the  fact  that  the  organism’s  pursued  result  is
specified in functional terms does not play any explanatory role in the success pattern proposal. The
success pattern proposal just assumes that there is a result; what determines it is an independent
matter. In what follows, I remain neutral on the problem of the specification of the pursued result.
 Last and not least, the success pattern  condition does not only require that in order for a
given sensory state to be intentional, the presence of the success pattern in the behavioural output is
enough. It also requires that the organism should use the sensory state as a proxy for the presence of
the relevant external condition in order to achieve the pursued result.  That is,  the  sensory state
guides the production of the behavioural output in the achievement of the organism’s pursued result.
The organism has a pursued result that is only achievable when a given external condition obtains.
Thus, it uses the  sensory state that stands for the external condition as a guide for achieving this
result  via  the  production  of  the  behaviour.  In  the  predator  example,  the  sensory state  is  a
representation of the predator  because it  satisfies both requirements.  First,  the behaviour  has a
success pattern – the success condition is the avoidance of predators. Second, the organism uses the
sensory state as a proxy for the whereabouts of the predator to escape from it (e.g., to move in the
opposite  direction).  The  sensory state  guides  the  organism in  the  production  of  behaviour  by
informing the organism about the location of the predator. 
Success pattern  condition.   A sensory state represents an external feature provided that there
is a success pattern in the system’s behavioural output and the system uses the state as a proxy
for the presence of the external feature in the production of this behaviour.
3. The Objection of Liberality  
 The core thesis of the success pattern proposal is that the distinctive explanatory power of
representational states  is  the explanation of successful behaviour.  The success pattern condition
rules out the intentionality of several systems: first, systems that have a behavioural output with no
success pattern; second, systems that  do not use the  relevant sensory state as a proxy for some
external feature in the production of behaviour. For instance, an eagle’s wing has success conditions
constituted by the biological goal of soaring, but the eagle does not use the wing state as a proxy for
the presence of any external feature. So, the wing state is not representational. 
 So far, so good. But here the objection of liberality strikes again. There are several systems
that satisfy the success pattern condition but nevertheless are clearly not intentional. What happens
is that success patterns are wide spread. They are present in very simple organisms – very doubtful
representational systems satisfy the success pattern condition.  Such organisms not only have the
behavioural output with a success pattern, but also use the relevant sensory state as a proxy for the
external condition to achieve their pursued goals. For instance, the success pattern proposal implies
that tropistic states, antidiuretic hormones and saliva are representational. 
 Consider osmolarity  in human blood (i.e., the number of solute particles in a quantity of
blood plasma). When it reaches above a  given level, the hypothalamus produces the antidiuretic
hormone. This hormone then triggers an action from the kidneys which ultimately lowers the level
of  osmolarity.  The  antidiuretic hormone  clearly  satisfies  the  success  pattern  condition.  The
hypothalamus has the biological goal of keeping osmolarity at a given level and, in order to do that,
produces this hormone to indicate high osmolarity. Finally, the kidney uses the hormone as a proxy
for  high  osmolarity  to  lower the level  of  osmolarity.  Nevertheless,  the antidiuretic  hormone is
clearly not a representation of high osmolarity: such a positing plays no distinctive explanatory role
(Schulte, 2015, p. 126).
 Tyler  Burge (2010, p. 300) and Kim Sterelny (1995) argue for the explanatory idleness of
positing  that  these  very  simple  sensory  states  are  representational.  Magnetosomes  of  maritime
anaerobic bacteria are attracted to the geomagnetic field and, hence, to the bottom of the ocean.
Moving  in  this  direction  is  adaptative  for  bacteria  since  the  surface  of  the  ocean  contains
oxygenated  waters  that  are  lethal.  Once  again,  the bacteria  clearly  satisfy  the  success  pattern
condition: first, there is a success pattern present on  their behaviour constituted by the biological
goal of reaching oxygen-free water; second, they use the alignment of magnetosomes as a proxy for
the  direction  of  oxygen-free  water.  However,  Burge  claims  that  positing  the  alignment  of
magnetosomes as a representational state is not explanatorily justified. The bacteria’s behaviour is
fully explained by the non-intentional explanation by specifying, first, the causal chain between the
magnetic field and the bacteria’s movement towards it; second, the biological goal of magnetesomes
– avoiding oxygenated waters. There is nothing left to be explained by the intentional explanation:
positing the  alignment of  magnetosomes as representational is explanatorily idle. In Burge’s own
words:  
“Everything in the example can be explained using the notion of biological function (with
respect  to  oxygen  poverty),  normal  environmental  conditions,  and  sensory  discrimination
(with respect to magnetic forces). Adding an odd use of the term ‘representation’ contributes
nothing to explanation.” (2010, p. 300).  
The  same  line  of  reasoning  shows  that  positing  the  antidiuretic  hormone  as  genuinely
representational is explanatorily idle.
 But  maybe this  line of reasoning against  the success  pattern proposal  is  not  fair. Burge
objects  that  the  explanation  of  the  successful  behaviour  of  tropistic  systems are  not  genuinely
intentional because they fail to have the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations.
After all,  one can always rephrase these explanations without appealing to any representational
notion: everything about the behaviour of tropistic systems can be explained using the notions of
biological function, sensory discrimination, etc. But note that any naturalist theory which aims to
reduce representational states to natural states is  automatically open to this objection: just replace
any notion of representation with the notions of the reducing natural states (e.g., biological function,
sensory discrimination, etc.). Burge’s line of reasoning does not show that the relevant naturalist
theory fails to pick out the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations. Why can’t the
relevant natural notions play the distinctive explanatory role of representational notions? This is
something that needs to be shown, one cannot just assume that this is the case.5
Still, Burge’s objection to the success pattern proposal may be developed to become more
robust. At its core is the idea that the success pattern proposal  trivialises the explanatory role of
representational states.  Tropistic systems satisfy the success pattern condition:  their  behavioural
outputs have  success patterns and they use the tropistic states as proxies  for the relevant external
conditions to pursue their biological goals. What happens is that they are so simple that it is very
implausible that the positing of tropistic states as representational is explanatorily justified. But why
is it so implausible?
 A full response to this question will have to wait until the next sections. However, for the
present purpose it is sufficient to point out that the tokening of a tropistic state is fully chained to a
very specific stimulus (Sterelny, 1995): in the case of the paramecium, light stimulus; in the case of
the anaerobic bacterium, magnetic stimulus, etc. That is, if the stimulus is present, the tropistic state
is tokened, and, so, triggers the behavioural output; if the stimulus is absent, there is no tokening at
all. But then it becomes very implausible that the positing of the tropistic state as representational
could give rise to the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations. How could tropistic
systems  harbour  representational  states  with  such  chained  behaviour?  Genuine  intentional
explanations simply have a more distinctive explanatory role. The positing of tropistic states as
representational states is not explanatorily justified.  
  The lesson to be taken is that the satisfaction of the success pattern condition is not enough
5 As Nicholas Shea puts it, “[t]his supposed challenge is not really a challenge at all, because it concedes everything
we need, leaving only a dispute about the appropriateness of the label ‘representation’” (2020, p. 205). I thank an
anonymous referee for pressing this objection. 
to give rise to intentional explanations. The fact that there is a success pattern in the behavioural
output, and that the organism uses the sensory state as a proxy for the external condition to produce
this  behaviour,  is  not  sufficient  for  intentionality.  The  positing  of  the  representation  is  not
explanatorily justified in the cases of the antidiuretic hormone, paramecium, anaerobic bacterium
and tropistic states in general. The conclusion is that the success pattern proposal is too liberal; it
draws the limits of intentionality too low. Thus, some further minimal condition for intentionality is
required to make it more restrictive. In what follows, I  defend the adoption of a second minimal
condition. The result is a dual proposal to demarcate the limits of intentionality.
4. Constancy Mechanism Plus Success Pattern: A Dual Proposal
 Intentional patterns are a  subset of success patterns. Every intentional pattern is a success
pattern, but not the other way around. For instance, behavioural outputs of anaerobic bacteria and
paramecia  have  non-intentional success  patterns.  The  explanatory  purchase  of  representational
states is only justified in the case of systems with  intentional success pattern behaviour. Success
patterns are patterns of interaction between the organism’s behaviour and some external condition.
They are present as long as the behavioural output pursues the achievement of a  certain result,
giving  rise to  the  explanation  of  successful  behaviour.  So, in  what  does  the  distinction of
explanatory powers due to intentional and non-intentional success patterns consist? 
 The presence of the success pattern gives rise to the explanation of successful behaviour, but
this  is not enough to justify the positing of the representation. The right approach to  draw this
distinction is to take a deeper look at the explanatory powers given rise to by success patterns in
general,  and,  then,  to  select  among  these  explanatory  powers  the  ones  that  are  distinctive of
intentional explanations.  
 In  what  follows,  I  defend  that  the  positing  of  representational  states  requires  further
explanatory powers, i.e.,  explanatory powers that are not given rise to by the success pattern. I
argue that the employment of a constancy mechanism gives rise to further explanatory requirements
by allowing the recognition of the presence of the same success pattern despite the variety of input
stimuli. So, a success pattern  in the behavioural output is intentional  provided that the organism
employs a constancy mechanism in the production of the relevant sensory state. On one hand, the
presence of the success pattern guarantees the rising of certain explanatory powers that originate in
the behavioural output triggered by the representation. On the other hand, the employment of the
constancy  mechanism guarantees  the  arising  of  other  explanatory  powers  that  originate  in  the
triggering of the tokened representation. They are distinct but complementary explanatory powers.
In sum, the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations,  the one that justifies
the  positing  of  the  representation,  is constituted  by  the  output  explanatory  power  (i.e.,  the
explanatory  power  given  rise  to  by  the  presence  of  the  success  pattern), and  by  the  input
explanatory power (i.e.,  the explanatory power given rise to by the employment of the constancy
mechanism). In the case of dissatisfaction of either the success pattern or the constancy mechanism
condition, the sensory system is not intentional. They are both minimal conditions for intentionality.
Let us start by introducing the constancy mechanism condition: 
Constancy mechanism condition. A sensory state represents an external feature provided
that  the  sensory  system employs  a  constancy mechanism in  its  production, such that  the
production of the state remains constant when the external feature obtains, despite the variety
of proximal stimuli reaching the system’s sensory apparatus.
Let  us  call “object  properties” those properties  of  objects  that  remain constant,  such as
colour,  size and shape:  a  rectangular door,  a  grey coffee cup,  etc.  Perceptual  constancy is the
perception of object properties as  remaining constant  even when illumination, distance, viewing
angle  and  other  things  cause  changes  in  the  proximal  stimuli reaching  the  sensory  system
(Goldstein, 2010, p. 309). For instance, a  grey coffee cup looks a uniform colour even when one
views it under uneven illumination. That is, the coffee cup still looks uniformly grey despite the fact
that the light reflected by the coffee cup’s unshaded regions to our retinas is very different from the
light reflected by its  shaded regions. This is a classic case of colour constancy: the visual system
still sees the object as having the same colour despite big differences (to a given degree) in lighting
conditions. The literature is full  of examples of perceptual constancies such as colour, size and
shape constancies.  
 What sensory systems with constancy mechanisms have in common is that they are capable
of stably producing the sensory state in response to the presence of an unchanging external feature
(e.g., colour or size), despite huge  variations in proximal stimuli coming from the environment.6
Assuming  for  the  sake  of  the  argument  that  a  given  sensory  system  is  representational,  the
employment of the constancy mechanism guarantees that the sensory state still represents the same
external feature despite the variety of proximal stimuli. 
 According  to  the  constancy  mechanism  condition,  a  sensory  state  is  representational
provided that the sensory system employs a constancy mechanism in its production. This minimal
condition was proposed, in different versions, by Burge (2010) and, arguably, Sterelny (1995). As
6 This is, evidently, a rough characterization of perceptual constancy. A deeper one needs to assess several problems
which emerge from distinct  characterizations,  but it  is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the debate on
perceptual constancy. For an overview, see Cohen (2015). 
previously shown, both reject the success semantics condition on the grounds that it is too liberal.
As an alternative, they propose the constancy mechanism condition. Here I take a different route. I
appeal to constancy mechanisms precisely to draw the distinction between  intentional and non-
intentional success patterns.  
 Suppose that a certain stimulus makes a tropistic system move in the opposite direction.
There  are  three different  explanations for  this  avoidance  behaviour.  First, the  causal-sequence
explanation is the specification of the causal chain that starts with the presence of the stimulus and
ends with the avoidance behaviour. The explanation is that the system has this avoidance behaviour
because of this causal chain. Second, the non-intentional success explanation is the specification of
a non-intentional  success  pattern.  It  specifies  the  causal  chain  and  posits  a  goal-directed
intermediate state, between the stimulus and the avoidance behaviour, that produces a goal-directed
behaviour.  The explanation  is  that  the  system has  this  avoidance  behaviour  because  it  tries  to
achieve its pursued result. Note that the causal-sequence explanation is just the specification of the
causal chain, while the non-intentional success explanation posits a goal-directed intermediate state
in the causal chain to explain the avoidance behaviour. Finally, the intentional success explanation –
the intentional explanation – also posits a goal-directed intermediate state, but in contrast with the
non-intentional success explanation it posits an intermediate state that is not only goal-directed, but
something  more:  a  representation.  The  explanation  is  that  the  system  moved  in  the  opposite
direction  from the  stimulus  because  it  represented  its  presence  and  this  representational  state
triggered the avoidance behaviour.
 The biological goal of avoiding the relevant stimulus constitutes the success pattern of the
tropistic system’s behavioural output. According to the intentional success explanation, this success
pattern is intentional – the intermediate state is representational; according to the non-intentional
success  explanation, this is a non-intentional success pattern – the intermediate state is  just goal-
directed.  However,  from an explanatory point  of  view,  it makes  no sense to  posit  this success
pattern  as representational because the intentional success explanation that it gives rise to has  the
same explanatory power as the non-intentional success explanation. That is, there is nothing left to
be explained and, so, the positing of the representation should be ruled out.
 Now  contrast  the  tropistic  system’s  non-intentional  success  pattern  with  a  genuinely
intentional  one.  Here the representational  state  is  triggered by several  stimuli (s¹, s², s³…) that
trigger  behavioural  outputs  to  pursue  the  same  result.  In  all  of  these  cases,  the  intentional
explanation bridges across a variety of different input stimuli. The positing of the representational
state allows the intentional explanation to identify the presence of the same success pattern despite
the  variety of  proximal stimuli.  By contrast, the non-intentional success explanation  misses the
identification  of  the  same  success  pattern  that  is  present  throughout  these  cases  because  they
involve different causal chains that start with different proximal stimuli. For every different causal
chain, the non-intentional explanation provides a distinct and independent explanation of behaviour,
missing that the same success pattern is common between them.  
 It is true that one can sum up all distinct causal chains into one single causal explanation by
simply conjoining them. But that would not allow for the identification of the same success pattern
– the mere conjunction of distinct causal explanations does not make any connection between them.
The identification of the same success pattern is only possible by positing the intermediate state as
representational.  Such a positing allows for  the recognition of the same success  pattern that  is
present in all of these distinct causal chains. But note that this recognition is only possible because
the  sensory system employs a  constancy mechanism in the production of the representation that
allows  it  to  represent  the  same  external  feature  despite  the  variety  of  proximal  stimuli.  The
identification of the same success pattern endows the intentional explanation with three distinctive
explanatory powers – generalization, predictive and counterfactual powers. Let us assess them.
4.1 Generalization, Predictive and Counterfactual Explanatory Powers 
 Perhaps the generalization power is the most evident one. The recognition of an intentional
success pattern gives rise to a general explanation of different instances of the same success pattern
in behavioural outputs triggered by different proximal stimuli. By contrast, non-intentional success
explanations are capable of explaining why a specific behaviour achieved a given result, but not of
providing a general explanation of why this kind of behaviour, originated by different  proximal
stimuli,  achieved  the  same result.  This  is  a  general  and unified explanation  that  embraces  all
instances  of  this  kind  of  behaviour.  What  makes  the  difference  is  that  the  positing  of  a
representation  bridges  across  different  proximal stimuli  and,  hence,  give  rises  to  intentional
explanations  of  the  form  “organism  O has  the  behaviour  B  because  it  represents  R”.  The
representation plays a unification role that makes viable the generalization over different behaviours
triggered  by  different  stimuli  throughout  the  organism’s  historical  and present  behavioural
situations.
 Suppose  that  an  organism  manifested  a  successful  avoidance  behaviour  throughout  its
behavioural history, and that now it is also manifesting this behaviour.  What is common in all of
these situations is the presence of some predator. Evidently, the pursued result is the avoidance of
predators and,  so, there is a success pattern present in these cases. How do intentional and non-
intentional success explanations explain the organism’s avoidance behaviour? The non-intentional
explanation consists in the specification of a distinct and independent causal chain of a behavioural
output and of the conditions under which it succeeds in avoiding predators.  However, it  fails to
establish any connection between this specific behaviour and other avoidance behaviours triggered
by different  stimuli,  since it  does  not  establish any connection  between their  respective causal
chains. In light of the non-intentional explanation, they are completely independent chains.  
 By contrast, the intentional explanation is a general explanation of the organism’s behaviour
in all  these situations:  the organism represents  the presence of  the predator,  which triggers  the
avoidance behaviour, which leads to the successful behaviour of avoiding the predator. This is only
possible because the intentional explanation abstracts from the specificities of different input stimuli
that  trigger the behaviour (e.g., a light array coming from a certain direction, another light array
coming from another direction, etc.). It unifies these stimuli by establishing what is common to all
of  them:  the  presence  of  the  predator.  Hence,  the  intentional  explanation  is  explanatory  more
powerful because it reaches a generality level that non-intentional success explanations are simply
incapable of reaching. There are only individual and independent non-intentional explanations of
specific behaviours in specific situations; there is nothing capable of unifying them by appealing to
something  in common throughout  these  specific  behaviours.  By  contrast,  the positing  of  the
representation  of  the  predator  is  precisely  the unifying  element that  provides  intentional
explanations with generalization power.
 The positing of representational states also provides intentional explanations with predictive
power.  The identification of the intentional  success pattern gives rise to the prediction that the
organism with the token representation will behave in the same way, and with the same success
conditions, as it behaved in past situations in which the pattern was present.7 The representation is a
predictive element that allows the intentional explanation to imply that the organism will have the
same behaviour,  with  the  same  success  conditions,  provided  that  the  same  intentional  success
pattern is present. By contrast, the non-intentional success explanation lacks this predictive power
because it fails to identify the intentional success pattern that is present despite the variety of input
stimuli.  This is  the case because the  non-intentional  success  explanation  lacks  an element  that
bridges across distinct stimuli that trigger behaviours – different input stimuli give rise to distinct
causal  chains.  In  the  absence  of  this  unifying  element,  the  intentional  success  pattern  is  not
identifiable. 
 The intentional explanation of the organism’s avoidance behaviour has a predictive power. It
establishes that the organism will escape whenever the intentional success pattern is present in the
avoidance behaviour. The presence of this pattern entails that the organism represents the presence
7 Notice, however, that the organism may fail to have a successful behaviour in virtue of an external problem (e.g., some
external element prevents success) or an internal one (e.g., biological malfunctioning). Here I just assume that there is
no external or internal problem.
of a predator. The representational state provides the intentional explanation with predictive power.
It is the  basis for the prediction that the representation of the predator will trigger the successful
avoidance  behaviour.  By  contrast,  the  non-intentional  success  explanation  cannot  make  any
prediction that the organism will have the same avoidance behaviour across different input stimuli
because it fails to identify the pattern that bridges across these inputs. At best, it predicts what will
happen in situations where exactly the same proximal stimulus triggers the behavioural output (e.g.,
the same light array coming from the same direction). 
 Last but not least, intentional explanations have counterfactual power.8 The identification of
the intentional success pattern  via the positing of the representational state allows the intentional
explanation to explain what would have happened in  counterfactual scenarios, provided that the
intentional success pattern is present in the behaviour. Suppose that in some past situation there was
a predator in the environment and the organism escaped from it. Now consider these counterfactual
scenarios: the organism or the predator are in different positions; different lighting conditions, etc.
What would then have happened in these counterfactual scenarios? 
 According to the intentional explanation, the organism would have an avoidance behaviour
because it would  represent  the predator.  In counterfactual situations, the behavioural outputs that
pursue the avoidance of predators are triggered by different input stimuli, but the positing of the
representation allows the identification of the intentional success pattern despite this multiplicity of
stimuli. By contrast, the non-intentional success explanation is not able to explain what would have
then happened because these counterfactual scenarios involve behavioural outputs that are triggered
by distinct input stimuli and, hence, by distinct causal chains. The non-intentional explanation lacks
the unifying element that would allow it to bridge over the variety of stimuli, that triggers the causal
chains, that would lead to successful behavioural outputs. Once again, the unifying element in the
intentional explanation is the representation.    
  The  difference  between  the  predictive,  generalization  and  counterfactual  powers  of
intentional explanations lies in what they explain. The predictive power is the explanation of future
behavioural  situations  (i.e.,  how  the  organism  will  behave).  The  generalization  power  is  the
explanation  of  past  and present behavioural  situations  (i.e.,  how  the  organism  behaved  and
behaves).  Finally,  the  counterfactual  power  is  the  explanation  of  counterfactual behavioural
situations  (i.e.,  how the  organism would  have  behaved),  in  opposition  with  generalization  and
predictive powers that are the explanation of actual behavioural situations.
8 Sterelny (1995) argues that the counterfactual power is a distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations
since they are robust-process explanations, in opposition with actual-sequence explanations. 
Here the  following  objection  may  arise  to my  argument  that  the  identification  of  the
intentional  success  pattern  endows  the  intentional  explanation  with  distinctive predictive  and
counterfactual powers. After all, non-intentional explanations support the prediction of what will
happen  and  what  would  have  happened.  They  are  based  on  natural  laws  that  give  support  to
predictions and counterfactual assessments. Based on the law of universal gravitation, one can infer
that because of gravity, if I had dropped an apple from my hand, it would have fallen. Similarly, if
the apple is dropped, it will fall. So, why is there no non-intentional explanation of counterfactual or
future behavioural situations?
 Once again, the touchstone  is the fact that the positing of the representational state allows
the  identification  of  the  same  success  pattern  throughout  the  organism’s  behavioural  outputs,
despite  the  variety  of  input  stimuli.  The  fundamental  explanatory  difference  is that  the  non-
intentional success explanation is  capable of explaining future and counterfactual scenarios that
involve the  same proximal stimulus. So, the non-intentional explanation is capable of explaining
what will happen if the same stimulus occurs (“if the same stimulus happens, the organism will
escape”) and what would have happened if the same stimulus had occurred (“if the same stimulus
would have occurred, the organism would have escaped”). By contrast, the intentional explanation
is capable of explaining what will or would have happened in scenarios in which a variety of input
stimuli  occur or would have occurred.  After all, the intentional explanation is capable of bridging
across these distinct stimuli in virtue of the identification of the same success pattern throughout
these scenarios. In sum, the intentional explanation has more powerful counterfactual and predictive
powers because the number of counterfactual and future scenarios that it is capable of explaining is
much  bigger than  the  number of  counterfactual  and  future  scenarios  that  non-intentional
explanations are capable of explaining.
4.2 Representational vs. non-representational systems
 I  have developed a dual proposal for the limits  of intentionality according to which the
success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions are both minimal conditions for intentionality.
The presence  of  a  success  pattern  is  not  enough  for  minimal  intentionality  because  there  are
intentional and non-intentional success patterns – the intentional one bridges across a variety of
input stimuli, while the non-intentional one cannot do that. The dual proposal, hence, rules out the
intentionality of success patterns present in the behaviour of several simple organisms. 
 Consider the  antidiuretic hormone example again. The hypothalamus produces  it to lower
the osmolarity of human blood when it  reaches above a certain level. As previously shown, it is
clear that the antidiuretic hormone satisfies the success pattern condition. Nevertheless,  it is not a
representational  state.  The  reason  is  that  the  hypothalamus  does  not  employ  any  constancy
mechanism. The production of the antidiuretic hormone is only triggered by the same  proximal
stimulus – high osmolarity. Such a line of reasoning also shows that anaerobic bacteria, paramecia
and other tropistic systems are not intentional since they fail to employ the constancy mechanism. 
What  about  sensory  states that  satisfy  the  success  pattern  and  constancy  mechanism
conditions  and,  hence,  are  representational?  There are  plenty  of  cases.  Vervet  monkeys have  a
complex signalling system. They give acoustically different alarm calls in response to at least three
different predators: leopards, martial eagles and pythons (Seyfarth & Cheney & Marler, 1980). The
alarm signals are  produced by the speaker monkey to signal  to other  monkeys the presence of
predators, so they can have specific avoidance behaviours that vary from signal to signal. Let us
concentrate on eagle alarms. When the monkeys are on the ground, eagle alarms cause them to look
up and/or run into trees in order to avoid the eagle’s stoops. When in the trees, eagle alarms cause
them to evoke looking up and/or running out of the trees. The authors conclude that these distinct
responses to the alarms suggest that “each alarm call effectively represented, or signified, a different
class of external danger” (Seyfarth & Cheney & Marler, 1980, p. 802), that is, the eagle’s presence.
It is clear that vervet monkeys represent the eagle. There is a success pattern, constituted by the
biological goal of avoiding predators, and the use of the  alarm call  as a proxy for the  eagle.  The
production of the alarm call remains constant when there is some eagle around, despite the variety
of  proximal  stimuli.  The  monkey  produces  the  alarm call at  different  positions,  distances  and
angles, which implies the employment of a constancy mechanism in its production (e.g., differences
in lighting conditions).
 Finally, simpler organisms such as some insects are also intentional. The honeybee performs
a waggle dance whose properties correlate with the distance,  from the hive,  of some source of
nectar. It dances to show other honeybees the direction of the source of nectar (Von Frisch, 1967).
Does the honeybee represent the source of nectar?  The waggle dance and the triggering of the
foraging behaviour have a success pattern – to gather nutrients – and there is the use of the waggle
dance as a proxy for nectar. It is also clear that the production of the waggle dance remains constant
in light of the presence of the same source of nectar, despite the variety of proximal stimuli. Since
the flowers, where the honeybee gets nectar, are likely to change every few days when they are in
bloom, the honeybee evolved the capacity to learn colours and shapes accurately.  For instance,
despite the change of colour or shape of some flower, the honeybee can still represent it as a source
of nectar (Srinivasan, 2010). The honeybee employs a constancy mechanism in the production of
the representational state of the location of nectar, otherwise it would not represent the same flower
as a source of nectar despite variations of colour and shape. So, honeybees are  representational
systems.
5. Input and output explanatory powers
 I  have  defended the  claim that  a  minimal  condition for  a  state  to  represent  an  external
feature is that it bridges across a  multiplicity of proximal stimuli coming from this feature. Does
this  bridging  condition  also  apply  to  the  behavioural  output?  That  is,  is  it  a  condition  for
intentionality  that the organism should produce a  variety  of  behavioural outputs  to  achieve the
pursued result? Not at all. There is room for the organism to be intentional even if it always has the
same behavioural output triggered by the tokening of the supposed representation. But isn’t there an
analogous explanatory argument in favour of this requirement? 
 My argument for the requirement that intentional success patterns bridge across a variety of
input stimuli  appeals to the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional explanations. Intentional
success  patterns  require a  variety  of  input  stimuli  in  order  to  have  room  for  the  distinctive
explanatory powers of intentional explanations. So why not appeal to  the analogous explanatory
argument that intentional success patterns should bridge across a variety of  behavioural outputs
because otherwise there would be no room for the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional
explanations? One could argue that the bridging across a variety of input stimuli by the intentional
success pattern is not enough to  leave room for the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional
explanations. What is wrong with this argument? I think that the requirement that the intentional
success pattern should bridge across a variety of input stimuli is enough to explain why intentional
explanations  have  predictive,  generality  and  counterfactual  powers.  The  contrast  with  the
requirement that the intentional success pattern should also bridge across a variety of behavioural
outputs is clear. 
 The positing of the relevant sensory state as representational is justified because otherwise
the  recognition  of  the  same success  pattern  as  being  present,  despite  the  multiplicity of  input
stimuli, would not be possible. Notice that the positing of the sensory state as representational is the
unifying element for the recognition of the presence of the same success pattern despite distinct
input stimuli. By contrast, such a positing is not required for the recognition that the same success
pattern  is  present  despite  the  variety  of  behavioural  outputs.  No  matter  how  different  the
behavioural outputs are, one can still recognise the presence of the same success pattern simply
because  they pursue the same result. After all, they are produced by the organism to achieve  this
result. So, the pursuit of the same result is the unifying element for the recognition of the presence
of the same success pattern despite the variety of behavioural outputs. But if that is the case, then
the positing of the sensory state as a representation would make no explanatory difference for one to
recognise the presence of the same success pattern despite the variety of behavioural outputs. That
is, such a positing would not play the unifying role required for the recognition of the same success
pattern. The conclusion is that the requirement that the representational state should bridge across a
variety of behavioural outputs is not a minimal condition for intentionality.   
 The  success  pattern  and  constancy  mechanism  conditions  are  minimal  conditions  for
intentionality. My arguments for both conditions are based on the explanatory powers given rise to,
respectively,  by  the  presence  of  the  success  pattern  in  the  behavioural  output  and  by  the
employment of the constancy mechanism in the production of the relevant sensory state. But what is
the relation between these two explanatory powers?  
 Let us call “success explanatory power” the explanatory power given rise to by the success
pattern and “constancy explanatory power” the explanatory power given rise to by the employment
of  the  constancy  mechanism.  The  fundamental  distinction  between  them is  that  the  success
explanatory  power  originates  from the  output  process  that  is  triggered by  the  tokening  of  the
representation, while the constancy explanatory power originates from the input process that causes
the tokening of the representation.
 On one  hand,  the  presence  of  the  success  pattern  is  required  in  the  behavioural  output
triggered by the representation. There is a success pattern provided that the sensory state pursues a
given result by triggering a behavioural output to achieve it. Hence, the presence of the success
pattern  gives  rise  to  an  explanatory  power  that  is  generated  by  a  constraint on  the  relevant
behavioural output process. So, the success explanatory power is an output explanatory power. On
the other hand, the employment of the constancy mechanism is a requirement that the sensory state
should be able to still represent the same external feature despite the variety of  proximal stimuli
coming from it. Whatever the explanatory power is arising from the bridging across a multiplicity
of input stimuli, it originates with a constraint on the input process that triggers the tokening of the
state. So, the constancy minimal condition is an input explanatory power. 
 This is  the reason that the dual proposal is  not ad hoc or  arbitrary.  It  is not a proposal
developed only to neutralize the objection of liberality or a proposal that arises from an arbitrary
conjunction of two minimal conditions that give rise to two different and unconnected explanatory
powers.  Rather,  this is  a  proposal  that  naturally arises  from the verification that  the constancy
mechanism condition originates from a constraint on the input process that triggers the tokening of
the sensory state and that the success pattern condition originates from a constraint on the output
process that is triggered by the tokening of the sensory state. 
 What about the similarities between the success and constancy explanatory powers? The
positing  of  a  result  pursued  by  the  sensory state  also  gives  rise  to  generality,  predictive and
counterfactual explanatory  powers,  just  as  occurs with  the  employment  of  the  constancy
mechanism. The pursued result  allows the recognition that  the  same success  pattern  is  present
despite  the  variety of  behavioural  outputs.  Such recognition  gives  rise  to  the  generality  power
because it provides a general and unified explanation of different behavioural outputs, produced in
different  instances,  as  pursuing  the  same  result.  The  explanation  bridges  across  different
behavioural outputs by recognising the presence of the same success pattern in  all of them. The
positing  of  the  external  result  pursued  by  the  sensory state  also  gives  rise  to  predictive  and
counterfactual  powers:  it  affords  the  recognition  that,  despite  the  production  of  different
behavioural outputs in  future or  counterfactual situations, the organism will or would pursue the
same result.
 However, notice that the success pattern condition does not require that the organism should
be able to produce a variety of behavioural outputs to achieve the pursued result. Therefore, there is
room for the sensory state to always trigger the same behavioural output and still satisfy the success
pattern condition.  In  such cases, the presence of the success pattern would not give rise to the
generality,  predictive and counterfactual powers since there would be no variety of behavioural
outputs. Nevertheless, the positing of the pursued result would still give rise to the explanation of
success. That is, the explanation specifies the external condition under which the behavioural output
succeeds  in  achieving  the  pursued result.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the
success pattern condition is guaranteed both in situations where there is a variety of behavioural
outputs as well as when the behavioural output is uniform.
     Last but not least, one may wonder why the constancy mechanism condition alone cannot
draw  the  proper  limits  of  intentionality.  That  is,  why  isn’t  the  satisfaction  of  the  constancy
mechanism condition sufficient  for  minimal  intentionality,  regardless  of  the  satisfaction  of  the
success pattern condition? Why the latter minimal condition is also required? The reason is that if
there is no success pattern present on the behavioural output, there is  no explanation of success.
That  is,  if  the  behavioural  output  pursues  no  result,  the  behaviour  of  the  organism cannot  be
assessed in terms of the success conditions for achieving the pursued result. As previously argued,
this  is  a fundamental part  of the distinctive explanatory power of intentional  explanations.  The
presence of the success pattern on the behavioural output gives rise to a success explanatory power
that  is  absent  in  the  non-intentional  explanation, even  if the  organism  satisfies  the  constancy
mechanism condition. Furthermore, the employment of the constancy mechanism gives rise to an
input explanatory power (the one given rise to by a constraint on the input process that triggers the
tokening of the sensory state), while the presence of the success pattern on the behaviour gives rise
to an  output explanatory power  (the one given rise to by a constraint on the behavioural output
process). If  the  sensory state  satisfies  the  constancy mechanism condition,  but  not  the  success
pattern condition, it follows that this state gives rise only to an input explanatory power, but not to
an  output  explanatory  power.  However,  the  distinctive  explanatory  power  of  intentional
explanations is constituted by both input and output explanatory powers. 
6. Conclusion
 In this paper, I developed and defended the dual proposal for the limits of intentionality.
Dual proposal. A sensory state represents an external feature provided that it satisfies two
minimal  conditions  for  intentionality:  (I)  the success  pattern condition: there is  a  success
pattern in the system’s behavioural output and the system uses the state as a  proxy  for the
presence  of  the  external  feature  in  the  production  of  this  behaviour;  (II)  the  constancy
mechanism condition: the production of the state remains constant when the external feature
obtains, despite the variety of proximal stimuli reaching the system’s sensory apparatus.
 The dual proposal has certain similarities with Peter Schulte’s demarcation proposal (2015).
He proposes the adoption of the constancy mechanism condition by teleosemantics to neutralize the
objection of liberality. However, the two proposals have fundamental differences. First, they diverge
on the resulting demarcation of the limits of intentionality. Schulte’s proposal is committed to the
thesis that it is the biological function that determines the organism’s pursued result, while the dual
proposal  is neutral on  this issue. The dual proposal just requires the existence of  some pursued
result,  no matter  whether  it  is  functionally  determined or  not.  Second and most  important,  the
explanatory  justifications  of  both  proposals  are  fundamentally  distinct.  Schulte  justifies  his
demarcation proposal by appealing to Sterelny’s argument (1995), based on the distinction between
actual-sequence  and  robust-process  explanations,  that  counterfactual  power  is  a  distinctive
explanatory power of intentional explanations. By contrast, the explanatory justification of the dual
proposal  is  twofold.  First,  the  satisfaction  of  the  success  pattern  condition  guarantees  the
explanation of success; second, the satisfaction of the constancy mechanism condition gives rise to
generality,  predictive and counterfactual  explanatory powers by allowing the recognition of the
presence of the same success pattern despite the variety of proximal stimuli. 
 I started this investigation on the minimal conditions for intentionality with the proposal of
the success pattern condition. However, this condition is not  sufficient for minimal intentionality.
The non-intentional explanation would have the same explanatory power by just  specifying the
relevant causal chain and the organism’s pursued result.  So, I argued that  the employment of the
constancy mechanism is required to distinguish  intentional from non-intentional success patterns.
After  that,  I  showed  that  the  success  and  constancy  explanatory  powers  are  compatible and
complementary. The result is that the dual proposal is not ad hoc or arbitrary. The satisfaction of the
success  pattern  and  constancy  mechanism  conditions  by  the  sensory  state  guarantees  that  its
positing as a representation is explanatorily justified. The conclusion is that the dual proposal fulfils
the explanatory role criterion for demarcation proposals of minimal conditions for intentionality
and, so, solves the problem of demarcation. The lesson to be taken is  that a naturalist  theory  of
representation  is immune to the objection of liberality as long as it is compatible with both the
success pattern and minimal conditions for intentionality.  
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